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SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTES: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
ALAN H. SWANSON
Sexual psychopath statutes are basically the
products of two major forces: news agencies and
private groups. The various news media have on
frequent occasions stirred public emotion by
giving greater attention to sex crimes than to
other types of crime." Then, too, certain elements
of society have realized that the commission of
sex crimes is usually, if not always, evidence of a
mental disorder which should be treated rather
than punished. 2 As a result of these forces, legisla-
tures in over one-half of the United States have
enacted statutes dealing particularly with sex
offenders 3
These statutes evidence varying degrees of
consideration and thoroughness.4 In general, how-
ever, they proceed on the premise that the "sexual
psychopath" is neither normal nor "legally insane"
and, for that reason, requires special considera-
tion, both for his own sake and for the safety of
society.5 The purposes of the sexual psychopath
I Slough & Schwinn, The Sexual Psychopath, 19
U. KA_. CiTY L. REv. 131, 133 (1951).2Ibid.
'See Appendix.
4 Compare the narrow scope of S.D. CODE §13.1727
(Supp. 1952) (one paragraph) with the very detailed
provisions of N.H. REv. STAT. ANNur. §§173.1-173.16
(1955) (seven and one-half pages).
6[The sexual psychopath laws] represent a
new approach, reflecting thinking of modern psy-
chiatry and psychology, in that they provide civil
commitment, segregation, and treatment of the
sexual psychopath rather than criminal punish-
ment.... Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 351 (1952).
statutes are thus twofold: to protect society and
to rehabilitate the offender.8
PROVISIONS OF SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTES
At present, twenty-six states and the District
of Columbia have enacted statutes which deal
with the commitment of "psychopathic" sex
offenders. Should the reader wish to compare the
essential elements of these various statutes, he is
referred to a comparison chart in the Appendix.
(The headings preceding the following paragraphs
correspond to the same headings in the Appendix.)
Elements of Definition
The statutes are not in agreement as to what a
"psychopathic" sex offender is, but, usually, such
a person is defined as one lacking the power to
control his sexual impulses or having criminal
propensities toward the commission of sex offenses.
7
8 As the New Hampshire Statute states:
ET]he frequency of sex crimes within this state
necessitates that appropriate measures be adopted
to protect society more adequately from aggressive
sexual offenders; ... [Tihe laws of this state do not
provide for the proper disposition of those who
commit or have a tendency to commit such crimes
and whose actions result from a psychopathic con-
dition; ... [S]ociety as well as the individual will
benefit by a civil commitment which would provide
for indeterminate segregation and treatment of
such persons .... N.H. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §173.1
(1955).
7E.g., MA!S. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §1 (Supp. 1958)
("Any person whose misconduct in sexual matters
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Some statutes add the requirement that he must
be a physical threat to others.8
Designation of Condition
As a result of the different definitions used to
describe the condition of such a person, the statutes
are not in agreement as to the proper designation
of his condition. The majority of statutes, for
example, label him a "sexual psychopath", while
others call him a "sexually dangerous person".
A few statutes mention no designation at all.
(For purposes of uniformity throughout this
comment all such persons, however defined, will
be referred to as "sexual psychopaths".)
Basis of Jurisdiction
There are three points of view as to what is
the basis for the courts' jurisdiction over sexual
psychopaths. Sixteen statutes provide that the
offender must have been convicted of some crime,
or of a specific sex crime before the court may
proceed to determine whether he should be com-
mitted for treatment.'0 Seven statutes merely
require that the alleged offender be charged with
some crime, or a sex crime." The remaining five
indicates a general lack of power to control his sexual
impulses ... "); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §820.01 (1959)
("All persons suffering from a mental disorder...
coupled with criminal propensities to the commission
of sex offenses.").
SE.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1166 (1958) ("[I]f
any such person ... constitutes a threat of bodily
harm to members of the public... the court... may
sentence such person to a state institution."); TEmN.
CODE AN. §33-1301 (Supp. 1959) ("['Sex offender'
includes] any person... who... is likely to attack or
otherwise inflict injury, degradation, pain or other
evil on the objects of his uncontrollable desires.").
9 For a criticism of the term "sexual psychopath",
see Hacker & Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in
Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CALr. L. REv.
766, 770 (1955).
0E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2947.25 (Baldwin
1958) ("After conviction and before sentence, a trial
court must refer for examination all persons convicted
under [specified sections] of the Revised Code, to the
department of mental hygiene and correction or to a
state facility designated by the department, or to a
psychopathic clinic approved by the department, or
to three psychiatrists. Prior to sentence the court may
refer for such examination any person who has been
convicted of any felony except murder in the first
degree where mercy has not been recommended, or
any misdemeanor involving a sex offense .... ") (em-
phasis added); UTAH CODE ANN. §77-49-1 (1953)
("Whenever any person is convicted of the offense of
rape, sodomy, incest, lewdness, indecent exposure or
carnal knowledge... the judge shall order a mental
examination of such person .... ).
" E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §822 (1959) ("When
any person is charged with a criminal offense and it
statutes do not even require that a charge be
brought against the person, but simply demand
that cause be shown that he probably is a sexual
psychopath.1
Discretion in Initiating Proceedings
The majority of statutes provide that the
state or district attorneys either may or must
initiate the sexual psychopath proceedings, de-
pending upon the statute and basis of jurisdic-
tion.13 A few states allow anyone showing cause,
or the individual on his own behalf, to request
a special hearing. 4 Many statutes provide that
if an alleged sexual psychopath is already on
trial for some crime, the trial judge may, in his
discretion, arrest the proceedings at any point
and order a mental examination and special
hearing for the defendant." Other statutes either
shall appear to the Attorney General or to the State's
Attorney of the county wherein such person is so
charged, that such person is a sexually dangerous
person, then the Attorney General or State's At-
torney ... may file with the clerk of the court in the
same proceeding wherein such person stands charged
with criminal offense, a petition...."); WASH. REv.
CODE §71.06.020 (1957) ("Where any person is charged
in the superior court in this state with a sex offense
and it appears that such person is a sexual psychopath,
the prosecuting attorney may file a petition in the
criminal proceeding, alleging that the defendant is a
sexual psychopath and stating sufficient facts to sup-
port such allegation.")
" E2.g., MUM. STAT. §526.10 (1957) ("The facts shall
first be submitted to the county attorney, who, if he
is satisfied good cause exists therefor, shall prepare
the petition ...."); NB. REv. STAT. §29.2902 (Supp.
1957) (See note 14 infra.).
"3E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §173:3 (1955) ("I.
Mandatory (1) Whenever a person is arrested and
charged with one or more of the following sex offenses:
[sex offenses specified], the county solicitor shall be
notified immediately and shall within seventy-two
hours of said arrest prepare a petition requesting the
superior court... to conduct an inquiry into his mental
condition.... II. Discretionary (1) Whenever facts
are presented to the county solicitor which satisfy
him that good cause exists for judicial inquiry as to
whether a person is a sexual psychopath he may prepare
a petition setting forth facts and requesting a court to
conduct an inquiry into the condition of such person.")
(emphasis added); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2947.25
(Baldwin 1958) (See note 10 supra.).
1 E.g., CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS §5501 ("[Tlhe
trial judge, on his own motion, or on motion of the
prosecuting attorney, or on application by affidavit
by or on behalf of the defendant... if there is Vrobable
cause ... may certify the person for hearing.'); NEB.
REv. STAT. §29.2902 (Supp. 1957) ("Whenever facts
are presented to the county attorney which satisfies
him that good cause exists for judicial inquiry ... he
shall prepare a petition....").
"5E.g., FLA. STAT. AnN. §917.12(2) (Supp. 1958)
("When a person has been charged by information
with any crime or when a person has been convicted
of any crime.., the trial judge on his own motion or
[Vol. 51
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require or allow the judge to order such an ex-
amination and hearing only upon the conviction
of the offender. 16
Medical Examination: Qualification of Examiners
Every sexual psychopath statute contains a
discretionary or mandatory provision for medical
examination of the alleged sexual psychopath.'
7
Usually, the staff of a state public health depart-
ment or one or more "qualified" doctors examine
the individual and then report their findings to
the court for its use in the disposition of the case.18
Some statutes define what they mean by "quali-
fied" doctors; others do not.' 9
Tribunal and Proceedings
A hearing of some kind is usually provided for
the purpose of determining whether one is a
sexual psychopath, but the required elements of
such a hearing vary widely from statute to statute.
on motion of the prosecuting attorney of said court
or on application by affidavit by or on behalf of the
defendant, if, it appears to the satisfaction of the
court that there is probable cause for believing such
person is a sexual psychopath within the meaning of
this act, may adjourn the proceeding or suspend the
sentence, as the case may be, and may certify the
person for hearing. .. ").
Ir See note 18 infra.
27 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §225A.4 (Supp. 1958)
("At said hearing the court shall determine whether
he shall be medically examined, if so, by whom such
examination shall be conducted, and the time and
p lace thereof.") (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN.
3-278.3 (1950) ("The trial judge shll have power
to re ure... a mental examination.") (emphasis
added).-
28E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1167 (1958) ("No
person ... shall be so sentenced until (1) a complete
psychiatric examination shall have been made of him
through the facilities of the Dept. of Welfare ... or
by a psychiatrist... and (2) a complete written
report thereof shall have been submitted to the court.");
VA. CODE ANN. §53-278.3 (1950) ("The trial judge
shall have power to require the Dept. of Mental Hy-
giene and Hospitals to have a mental examination
made of such person, and report thereon, to be made
by a psychiatrist employed in any State hospital or
in any mental hospital maintained by the State. Such
report, when furnished to a judge, shall be available
to the counsel for defendant and to the Common-
wealth's attorney.").
1E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §823.a (1959) (" 'Qual-
ified psychiatrist' means a reputable physician licensed
to practice in Illinois who has specialized in the diag-
nosis and treatment of mental and nervous disorders
for a period of not less than five years."); ORE. REv.
STAT. §137.112 (1957) ("The superintendent of the
institution.., shall designate a qualified psychiatrist,
who may be either a member of the hospital staff or a
psychiatrist engaged in private practice, to conduct
the examination of such person.").
In many instances where a hearing is required,20
some or all of the following rights are granted:
(1) notice of hearing;" (2) personal attendance
at hearing,"2 (3) counsel;21 (4) habeas corpus; 4




(8) appeal.28 If the statutes do not explicitly
provide for these provisions, the courts frequently
read them into the statutes.2
9
Many statutes also indicate that the past crimes
20 Some statutes provide that private hearings may
be had at the court's discretion: IowA CODE ANN.
§225A.9 (Supp. 1958) ("The court may order the public
excluded from such proceedings."); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §173:5 (1955) ("The court may, in its discretion,
exclude the general public from attendance at such
hearing.").
2E.g., Imw. ANN. STAT. §9-3405 (Supp. 1959)
("Such hearing shall not be had until ten (10) days
after service of a copy of such petition upon the person
so charged."); Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.720 (1949) ("The
court shall ... give to the person to be examined at
least five days notice thereof.").
22E.g., CaL. WELrAna & INST'NS §5511 ("The
alleged sexual psychopath shall be present at the
hearing....").
2 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.12(2) (Supp. 1958)
("The accused psychopath shall have the right to
have legal counsel present and assisting him at such
hearing."); CAL. WEIxARE & INsT'Ns §5511 ("[]f
he has no attorney, the judge may appoint an attorney
to represent him .. , if he determines that the person
is not financially able to employ counsel.")
24 No statutory provision on habeas corpus has been
found, but the courts nevertheless provide for the
right. E.g., In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d
652 (1944) cert. denied, 329 U.S. 767 (1946).
"5E.g., IowA CODE ANN. §225A.3 (Supp. 1958)
("Upon filing of such petition, the court in which the
public offense is charged may order that the bail
furnished be released and that additional bail be
ordered.").
"-E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.720 (1949) ("The
person charged... shall have the right to present
evidence in his behalf...."); MiNN. STAT. §526.10
(1957) ("The 'patient' shall be entitled to have sub-
peonas issued out of court to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his behalf.").
2
7 E.g., CAL. WErxAr & I ST'Ns §5506 ("When
the psychiatrist is called and examined by the court
the parties may cross-examine him in the order directed
by the court."); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2947.25
(Baldwin 1958) ("Both the state and such person,
his guardian, or next friend may appear in person or
by counsel at such hearing, subpeona, examine, and
cross-examine the examiners making the report... .").
"8E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §959.15 (1958) ("[T1he
person whose liberty is involved may appeal to the
proper appellate court.... ."); Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.720
(1949) ("The person charged shall have full rights of
appeal.").
"E.g., People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311
P.2d 897 (1951) (offender entitled to bail presence at
hearing, counsel, and appeal); Ex parte Keddy, 105
Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951) (offender en-
titled to release on bail); In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich.
313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 767
(1946) (offender entitled to right of habeas corpus).
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and behavior of the alleged sexual psychopath
are admissible in evidence. 30 Some statutes provide
that a jury shall decide the facts if the alleged
offender or the court so desires. 3'
On the other hand, numerous statutes provide
for only a few or none of these elements.32 Some
simply require that the judge, without a special
hearig, determine solely on the basis of medical
reports whether the alleged sex offender should
be committed for treatment."
Should the judge or jury decide that the in-
dividual is not a sexual psychopath, he may be
discharged, ordered to face criminal charges, or
required to serve out a sentence already imposed
upon him by the criminal court. On the other
hand, should the judge or jury decide that he is a
sexual psychopath he will in most cases be sent
to a state mental hospital, or the psychiatric
division of a state penitentiary, to receive special
treatment for an indeterminate duration.3 In
"OE.g., IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §824 (1959) ('[I1t
shall be competent to introduce evidence of the com-
mission by the respondent of any number of
crimes...."); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §5 (Supp.
1958) ("ilt shall be competent to introduce evidence
of the person's past criminal and sexual psychiatric
record and any other evidence that tends to indicate
that he is a sexually dangerous person.").
Compare In re Mundy, 97 N.H. 239, 85 A.2d 371
(1952) (where the court held that the State of New
Hampshire had the right to admit the opinion of a
psychiatrist even though part of his testimony was
based on hearsay) with People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill. 2d
261, 139 N.E.2d 776 (1957) (where the court sustained
the defendant's contention that the lower court erred
in admitting a psychiatrist's statements that according
to certain records there was a history that defendant
had attacked his sister, and that defendant's mother
was concerned about him and had stated she would
like to have him sent to an institution because she
was afraid he would commit a sex crime).
31E.g., Mo. STAT. ANN. §202.720 (1949) ("The
judge may at his discretion, and at the request of the
person charged in the petition shall, provide for the
determination of the issue of criminal sexual psycho-
pathy by a jury.").
Note that some statutes specifically provide that
there is to be no jury trial, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§173:5 (1955) ("There shall be no right to a trial by
jury .... ).
32E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§434-442 (Supp. 1956);
Wyo. Com. STAT. ANN. §§7-348-7-362 (1957).
"3E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§33-1301-33-1305
(Supp. 1959); UTAH CODE ANN. §§77-49-1-77-49-8
(1953).
3E.g., WASH. Rxv. CODE §71.06.090 (1957) ("A
sexual psychopath shall be retained by the superin-
tendent of the institution involved until in his opinion
he is safe to be at large .... "); Wyo. Comp. STAT.
ANN. §7-356 (1957) (''Orders of commitment made...
shall not specify minimum or maximum period of
detention.., but in no event shall the convicted
person be confined, or be subject to parole or probation
supervision, for a period of time greater than the
some cases, however, out-patient treatment is
allowed.3n
Procedure for Release
The statutes require regular examinations of
the sexual psychopath during his commitment36
The results are to be recorded and reported to the
committing court or a parole board at specified
times 3 7 Upon petition by the offender, by his
relatives or friends, or by those in charge of him
during commitment, the case may come up
for consideration either before the committing
court or a reviewing board. 8
Nature of Release: Whether Complete or Subject
to Supervision
During this hearing, the main question for
determination is whether the sexual psychopath
is cured to the degree that he will no longer con-
stitute a menace to society. If it is decided that
further treatment is necessary, the offender will
remain in the appropriate institution. If he is
found to have recovered sufficiently, the releasing
authority may, depending upon the statute, set
the offender free, place him on probation (some-
maximum provided by law for the crime of which such
person was convicted of or to which he pleaded
guilty .... ").
35 E.g., N.J. Rxv. STAT. §2:192-1.16 (Supp. 1951)
("The court may place such person on probation with
the requirement, as a condition of said probation,
that he receive out-patient psychiatric treatment in
the manner to be prescribed in each individual case.").
36 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3408 (Supp. 1959)
("[The psychopath] shall be examined at least once a
year by two (2) physicians... who shall report in
writing their findings.., to the committing court
and to the counsel."); FLA. STAT. ANN. §917.03 (Supp.
1958) ("The superintendent of the institution wherein
the person is committed by the circuit court judge
shall cause to be made periodic examinations of such
persons with the view of determining the progress of
treatment and shall file a report in writing to the
committing court not less than once each year.").37 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. A-NN. §39-19-6 (Supp.
1957) ("[T]he Colorado state board of parole shall
cause to be brought before it... all reports, records
and information concerning such person, for the pur-
pose of determining whether such person shall be
paroled....").
38 E.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2947.28 (Baldwin
1958) ("[A]ny person committed... may make ap-
plication personally, by counsel, or by guardian or
next friend, for his release...."); MAss. ANN. LAWs
ch. 123A, §9 (Supp. 1958) ("Any person committed...
shall be presented to the parole board for consideration
for parole by the superintendent... with the recom-
mendations ... that he is a fit person for parole....
[A]ny person committed... shall be entitled to have a
hearing ... every 12 months, upon the filing of a
written petition by a committed person, his parents,
spouse, issue, next of kin or any friend.").
[Vol. 51
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times subject to out-patient treatment), or place
him on parole.39
Effect of Commitment on Criminal Proceedings
If the sexual psychopath had previously been
convicted of a criminal offense, he may, upon
release, still have to complete the sentence al-
ready imposed upon him. The statutes take varied
positions on this matter; some allow commitment
as a sexual psychopath to constitute a complete
defense to any further criminal proceedings or
incarceration growing out of the same crime which
led to the offender's commitment for treatment;
4 0
others consider it no defense at all;4' and still
others compromise these two positions in various
ways. As an example of the latter, the Ohio
Statute provides that if the offender was treated
for a period less than the maximum sentence for
the offense of which he was convicted, such
offender, upon his release from treatment, will
have to serve out the remainder of the criminal
sentence in a penal institution. If, however, such
person was confined for a period equalling or
exceeding the maximum sentence for the offense
of wbich he was convicted, the individual is to
be released on a parole basis.
42
9E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §7749-7 (1953) ("[He]
shall be placed on probation, paroled, or pardoned,
[when] the superintendent... shall certify to the
probation, parole, or pardoning authority that such
person has recovered sufficiently... so that it appears
reasonably certain that repetition of the sex
offenses.. .is unlikely."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§825c (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958) ("Whenever the
Director finds that any person committed to him...
appears no longer to be sexually dangerous... [he]
may petition the committing court for an order author-
izing the conditional release of any person committed
to him .... ").40 E .g., IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3409 (Supp. 1959) ("No
person who is found.., to be a criminal sexual psy-
chopathic person... may thereafter be tried or sen-
tenced upon the offense with which he originally stood
charged, or convicted, in the committing court .... );
Micir. STAT ANN. §28.967(8) (1954) ("No person who
is found in such original hearing to be a criminal sexual
psychopathic person... may thereafter be tried or
'sentenced upon the offense with which he originally
stood charged, or convicted... .").4 E.g., FLa. STAT. ANN. §917.12(3) (Supp. 1958)
("[I]f criminal proceedings are still pending against
such person then they shall recommence...."); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §2815 (1958) ("Upon his discharge
from such confinement, such person shall be returned
for sentence to the court wherein he was convicted.").
42 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §2947.27 (Baldwin 1958)
("If the person has been confined for a period less
than the maximum sentence for the offense of which
he was convicted, the order shall terminate the in-
definite commitment. Thereupon the sentence which
was suspended... shall forthwith go into effect and
the person shall be transferred to the appropriate
If the sexual psychopath had not been previously
convicted of but only charged with a criminal
offense, upon his release he may still have to
stand trial for the crime with which he was charged.
This of course would depend upon whether the
statute of limitations had run or whether it had
stopped running during the period of treatment.
If the criminal trial had actually begun, but was
arrested during its course by the trial judge,
the criminal proceedings may later be re-com-
menced without the statute of limitations raising
a bar. But no case or statute has been found which
indicates that the statute of limitations either is
or is not tolled during the period of treatment
for sexual psychopaths where a criminal indictment
bad not been previously filed. As a result, one
can only speculate as to what the courts will
do if such a case arises.
Thus far no court has indicated that it would
find any constitutional objections if a released
offender is later tried for his criminal offense,
though certainly a persuasive double jeopardy
argument can be advanced. (This argument will
be considered later in greater detail.) Furthermore,
if the offender is to be prosecuted for the offense
which led to his treatment, it is unfair to try him
upon the recovery from his abnormality for the
offense over which he had no control. Nevertheless,
a subsequent prosecution may be justified if
punishment will have a deterrent effect upon
other potential offenders.
PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE CONSTRUCTION AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEXUAL
PSYCHOPATH STATUTES
The basis of the states' authority for enacting
sexual psychopath statutes is said to rest on both
the police power4l and the doctrine of parens
penal or reformatory institution.... If such person
has been confined for a period equalling or exceeding
the maximum sentence for the offense of which he
was convicted, the order shall provide that the person
be placed on trial visit under supervision.").
Some states, inaddition to, or apart from, the sexual
psychopath statutes, have laws which require the
periodical examination of inmates to ascertain whether
any convict has become or given evidence that he is
a sexual psychopath, e.g., Iu.. Rlv. STAT. ch. 108,
§112 (1957). In a few states there also are statutes
requiring that prior to an inmate's eligibility for parole,
the parole board may examine the innhate and there-
upon disclose that release would be inadvisable because
the inmate is still suffering from mental, moral, or
physical impairment, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §77-539
(1958); Miss. CODE Am. §4004-03. (1942).
41 By virtue of the tenth amendment to the federal
1960]
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patriae.U These powers are not without bounds,
however, for their exercise must be reasonable.
The constitutional guarantees of personal liberty
cannot be unreasonably or arbitrarily invaded."5
Furthermore, statutes enacted as a result of the
police power must have some actual and reasonable
relation to the maintenance and promotion of the
public health and welfare---and such must in fact
be the end sought to be obtained.
46
For the past quarter of a century, the various
provisions of the sexual psychopath statutes have
been the objects of considerable legal controversy.
The usual attacks have been that the statutes
deny due process47 and equal protection of the
laws, 48 impair the right to a trial by jury 9 and the
privilege against self-incrimination," place the
offender in double jeopardy,5' and contradict the
constitution (U.S. CONST. amend. X), the states have
authority to:
make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordi-
nances, either with penalties or without, not repug-
nant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of
the subjects of the same. Comm'r. v. Alger, 61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851).4 4Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state
has a sovereign right and duty of guardianship as to
persons found to be criminal sexual psychopaths and
dangerous to the health, morals, and safety of its
citizens, and to themselves. State ex rel. Sweezer v.
Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1952).
45 RussELL, THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE
(1900); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267
(1943) (only reasonable interference with personal
liberty is permissible).4 6 Ibid.
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (due process clause
which is applicable to the states).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (equal protection
clause which is applicable to the states).4
1In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934), the United States Supreme Court held that the
right to a jury trial in criminal and civil cases as pro-
vided for in U.S. CONST. amends. VI & VII is no longer
viewed as essential to due process under the fourteenth
amendment. But the objection made is nevertheless
valid since practically every state in the Union has
constitutional provisions providing for the right to
trial by jury in civil and criminal cases. Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 140 (1959).50 In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908),
the United States Supreme Court held that the federal
privilege against self-incrimination found in U.S.
CONST. amend. V was not applicable to the states via
the fourteenth amendment. Practically every state
constitution, however, has a clause providing for the
privilege against self-incrimination. See, INDEX DIGEST
OF STATE CONSTITIONS 468 (1959).
5, The United States Supreme Court in Louisianna
ex rd. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), as-
sumed, but without so deciding, that the double
jeopardy clause in U.S. CONST. amend. V applies to
the states via the fourteenth amendment. Furthermore,
practically every state constitution has its own double
jeopardy clause. See, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CON-
sTITUTIONS 576 (1959).
constitutional guarantees against cruel and unusual
punishments. 5 2 Although the courts generally have
not found these contentions sufficiently persuasive
to defeat any of the sexual psychopath statutes,-
except in one instance,5 4 it cannot be assumed that
these contentions are invalid. Debate still con-
tinues whether constitutional rights are denied by
the sexual psychopath laws.
Classification of Sexual Psychopaths
The most frequent attack upon the sexual
psychopath statutes is that they deny due process
and equal protection of the laws because of
improper classification.-" The right of the legis-
latures to devise classifications of persons and
things under its jurisdiction for purposes of
legislation is well recognized, provided these
classifications are in accord with the aims sought
to be achieved and are based upon understandable
and justifiable distinctions. The classifications
must be reasonable; they must not be arbitrary or
capricious.
Although the courts have not seen fit to in-
validate any sexual psychopath act on the ground
of improper classification,-6 nevertheless, strenuous
objection can be made to the holdings of the courts
in this area. The various concepts used in the
statutes are to a great degree meaningless and
52In Louisiana ex rd. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947), five members of the Court assumed,
but without so deciding, that violations of U.S. ConsT.
amend. VIII as to cruel and unusual punishments
would also be violative of the fourteenth amendment.
Furthermore, practically every state constitution has
a clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments.
See INDEX DIGEST Or STATE CONSTITUTIONS 343
(1959).51 The courts have generally upheld the validity of
all sexual psychopath statutes, although not without
reservations and admonitions with respect to the pos-
sible infringement of personal liberty. See People v.
Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957);
State ex rd. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232
S.W.2d 897, (1952); State v. Wingler, 25 N.J. 161,
135 A.2d 468 (1957).
14 People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534
(1938) (court held the Michigan sexual psychopath
statute unconstitutional because it deprived the
offender of a trial by jury of the vicinage).
65 For an explanation of the due process clause, see
12 Am. JuR. Cn. Law §§567-639 (1938). For an ex-
planation of the equal protection clause, see 12 Am.
JU. Ci. Law §§468-503 (1938).
56 E.g., Minnesota ex rd. Pearson v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270 (1940); People v. Sims, 382 Ill. 472,
47 N.E.2d 703 (1943); People v. Chapman, 301 Mich.
584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
A California appellate court has even gone so far
as to hold that unreasonableness of classification in and
of itself is insufficient. It must be "palpably unreason-
able" if it is to deny equal protection. Morganti v.
Morganti, 222 P.2d 78 (Cal. App. 1950).
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incomprehensible, since they do not permit
evaluation of abnormality to be made according
to objective medical or legal standards.57 When
definitions are provided they usually are so
indefinite that they require further definition if
any degree of clarity is to be achieved.55
Hence, it is exceedingly difficult to determine
who comes within the statutory provisions. Neces-
sarily, such indefiniteness is left to the discretion
of the judges, juries, and examining physicians
who unfortunately make their decisions on the
basis of relative morality, social and cultural bias,
and accidental and subjective notions of what is
"normal."
Thus, the argument can be made that due
process is denied by sexual psychopath statutes
since the offender may be confined under most
statutes for an indeterminate period of time on the
mere subjective determinations of so-called legal
and medical "experts". 59 Although a certain degree
of vagueness in almost any statute may be healthy,
since a certain amount of discretion and freedom
on the part of the judge may be necessary for him
to see that justice is done, nevertheless, the "over-
riding objection of such vagueness is that prose-
cutors may harass the citizenry by stretching the
meaning of statutory provisions so as to include
many persons who could never be successfully
prosecuted in a criminal trial.' 0
Since the concepts used in the statutes are
admittedly vague, the classifications based on
these concepts are equally vague. The fact that
judges, juries, physicians, and other persons in-
5T Thus, with respect to the phrase "lack of customary
standards of good judgment," the court in In re Moul-
ton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26 (1950), said, "This may
mean all things to all men and entirely different things
to different groups of men."
58 Hacker & Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in
Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CAxar. L. REv.
766 (1955).
5'See Sutherland, The Secual Psychopath Laws,
40 J. Camn. L. & C. 543 (1950).
C0 [Prosecutors and judges], it is said, are anxious
to make records as vigorous and aggressive defenders
of the community. They favor the most severe penalty
available, are not willing to look upon the sex offender
as a patient, and use the psychopath laws only when
evidence is so weak that conviction under the criminal
law is improbable. If this be the case, and there is
cause to believe that it is partially true, then the ad-
ministrator must be enlightened through the combined
efforts of medical and legal experts. Open minded,
intelligent administration by the members of the bar
and the medical profession should make for some
improvement over the anemic status quo; and in time,
the errors and lack of foresight prevalent in any legis-
lation will be corrected." Slough & Schwinn, The
Sexual Psychopath, 19 U. KAN. Crry L. R~v. 131,
151 (1951).
volved in the sexual psychopath proceedings are
not governed by objective standards may well
lead to a denial of equal protection of the laws.
This problem is especially acute where the
statutes do not distinguish between the different
types and degrees of mentally abnormal sex
offenders."' In some states, no distinction is made
between the dangerous sex criminal and the rela-
tively harmless sex deviates, such as homosexuals,
peepers, exhibitionists, and fetishists.6" A serious
question thus arises: where there is admittedly no
successful treatment for many of these less
dangerous offenders, is the possible indefinite
incarceration of such individuals justified in view
of the small amount of annoyance they cause?
Certainly in these cases the statutes are not hitting
the evil where it is most felt.
It has further been submitted that the classifi-
cations are unreasonable because anyone who
commits a serious crime is sufferipg from some
mental abnormality." Why should those persons
who have a propensity for committing sex crimes
be treated any differently than those who have
propensities for committing other types of crime? 4
Every individual has the right not to be classified
differently than anyone else, except for good
reason. To place mentally abnormal sex offenders
in a separate category assumes they are suffering
from a malady peculiarly different than other
types of offenders. Perhaps so, but it seems that
all criminals are suffering from some basic mental
abnormality which should be the basis of classifi-
cation in this area.
It is naive to classify a particular group of
offenders according to one symptom of their
illness and treat them differently from those whose
different overt acts of deviate behavior may be a
61 Hacker & Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in
Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 766
(1950); Slough & Schwinn, The Sexual Psychopath,
19 U. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 131, 133 (1951).
62E.g., Onso REv. CODE ANN. §§2947.24-2947.29
(Baldwin 1958); S.D. CODE §13.1727 (Supp. 1952);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§77-49-1-7749-8 (1953).
3Hacker & Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Ac in
Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CtArr. L. REv. 766,
778 (1955).
61 Although it has been argued that they should be
treated differently because they are recidivists, it
appears that the weight of authority is to the contrary.
In figures comapiled by the F.B.I., sex offenders are
shown to have a low rate of recidivism. Furthermore,
it is not true that sex offenders progress from less
serious sex offenses to those of a more serious nature.
For studies in this area, see, Sutherland, The Sexual
Psychopath Laws, 40 J.Camn. L. & C. 543, 547 (1950);
Report of the Illinois Commission on Sex Offenders-
To the 68th General Assembly of the State of Illinois
(1953).
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sign of the same basic mental "abnormality" or
disturbance. Other groups of offenders, such as
arsonists, murderers, or thieves, may manifest the
same basic illness in their own peculiar way. Why
are not they also given this special type of
treatment? It seems wrong to limit the application
of the statutes to those persons who have com-
mitted specified sex crimes.
If the sex offender belongs to the larger category
of "persons with propensities to commit crimes,"
then it necessarily follows that the sexual psycho-
path laws are allowing classifications to be made
on unreasonable and unjustifiable distinctions, and
as a result are denying alleged sex offenders equal
protection of the laws. Hence, the sex offender
should be handled no differently than any other
type of offender-or, better still, all types of
offenders should be effectively "treated" in much
the same fashion as sexual psychopaths are (or are
supposed to be) treated.
Perhaps the treating of sexual psychopaths will
eventually pave the way to the treatment of all
persons classified as "criminals." At present,
however, one must realistically recognize the fact
that with present medical and psychiatric
knowledge such would not be feasible. Further-
more, because the public mind is not prepared to
accept new ideas of correction rather than punish-
ment, the citizenry as a whole would probably not
subscribe to the idea.
The Nature of the Sexual Psychopath Hearings
A somewhat different but related problem is
whether the hearings provided for by the sexual
psychopath statutes deny the alleged offender due
process of law.
An answer to this problem depends on whether
the proceedings under the sexual psychopath acts
are criminal or civil.61 Should they be considered
criminal, then there may be a denial of due process
if the accused is put in double jeopardy, or is
forced to testify against himself, or is not guaran-
teed the rights of public hearing, notice, personal
attendance, counsel, habeas corpus, jury trial,
presentation of evidence, subpeonaing of witnesses,
cross-examination, and appeal.6
6 5 See, Mihm, A Re-Examination of the Validity of
Our Sex Psychopath Statutes in the Light of Recent Appeal
Cases and Experience, 44 J.Cmu. L., C. & P. S. 716
(1954).
66 Practically every state constitution provides for
all or most of these rights. See INnax DIGEST OF STATE
CONSTITUTONS (1959).
For some recent cases holding that sexual psychopath
To escape the double jeopardy argument, the
courts have held that the proceedings are civil in
nature and, therefore, the offender is not being
"tried" for a criminal offense.67 The courts'
strongest argument is that the end result of such
proceedings is "treatment" rather than punish-
ment.6 8 Nevertheless, even though the proceedings
might be civil in nature, there can still be a denial
of due process if the accused is not granted a fair
hearing.
But it is submitted that the proceedings are
neither criminal nor civil, but, rather, in the nature
of an inquest conducted primarily for the benefit
of the person whose mental state is in question. 9
The purpose of the inquest is not to adjudge one
party guilty or liable, as in criminal or civil
proceedings, but is to constitute a means whereby
the ,irresponsible sex offender may ultimately be
committed to treatment. Nevertheless, regardless
of whether the hearing is criminal, civil, or in the
nature of an inquest, those statutes which do not
grant the accused a fair hearing deny him due
process of law. It is also to be noted that even
though the statutes in and of themselves might be
proceedings are not criminal, see: People v. Stice, 161
Cal. App. 2d 610,327 P.2d 201 (1958); People v. Hymes,
161 Cal. App. 2d 668, 327 P.2d 219 (1958); State v.
McDaniels, 307 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1957); Mc-
Goldrick v. Downs, 184 Misc. 168, 53 N.Y.S.2d 333
(App. Ct 1945).67 E.g., People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311
P.2d 897 (1957), where the court held that there was
no double jeopardy because the sexual psychopath
statute is essentially civil in nature and the double
jeopardy clause is applicable only to two successive
criminal proceedings for the same offense.
For cases holding that sexual psychopath pro-
ceedings are civil in nature, see: People v. Capoldi, 10
Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776 (1957); State ex rt. Sweezer
v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d 897 (1952); Ex
parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159
(1951); But see notes 69 & 70, infra.
68 The courts frequently base their conclusions on
the assumption that the legislatures were merely ex-
tending the laws concerning insanity proceedings to
embrace sexual psychopath proceedings as well. The
care, treatment, and indeterminate commitment of
persons who are insane has been considered by some
courts as a civil proceeding. Hirst v. Cramer, 195
S.W.2d 738 (Mo. 1946); Mihm, A Re-Examination of
the Validity of Our Sex Psychopath Statutes in the
Light of Recent Appeal Cases and Experience, 44 J.
Cnms. L., C. & P.S. 716, 718 (1954).
61 Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Men-
tally Ill, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 307, 344 (1946).
For cases holding that insanity proceedings are
neither civil nor criminal, but in the nature of an
inquest, see: In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d 142
(1940); Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo, 310, 236 Pac.
995 (1925); State v. Linderholm, 84 Kan. 603, 114
Pac. 857 (1911); In re Bresee, 82 Ia. 573, 48 N.W.
991 (1891).
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constitutional, the manner in which the statutes
are applied and the proceedings conducted
pursuant to them may amount to a deprivation of
due process.
The fact that sexual psychopath proceedings
may lead to criminal prosecution, to involuntary
hospitalization, or even to placement in a penal
institution leaves little doubt that they have all
the possible consequences of a criminal trial. One
court has explicitly recognized the fact that many
elements in such proceedings are criminal in
nature.70 Furthermore, the sexual psychopath
statutes are frequently found in the state criminal
codes. 7' This was one of the reasons the Michigan
Court in People v. Frontczak invalidated the first
Michigan sexual psychopath statute.72 Perhaps
this evidences the legislatures' real thoughts that
such statutes are more criminal in nature than civil.
It must be realized that in order for the pro-
ceedings to be civil in nature, they must provide
for "treatment" and not for punishment.73 If
punishment is the end result, then in those states
where the offender must be convicted of certain
criminal charges before proceedings for commit-
ment as a mentally abnormal sex offender may be
initiated, the offender is put in double jeopardy
70 Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270 P.2d
1025 (1954) (court held that since the sexual psycho-
path proceedings have features which are criminal in
nature, the expense of transcripts must be borne by
the state). But, with the Gross case, compare People v.
Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957), where
the court held that the sexual psychopath proceedings
are not converted from civil to criminal simply be-
cause many procedural safeguards commonly existing
in criminal cases also exist in cases under the sexual
psychopath act. The court said it is the substantive
effect of the act and not its procedural aspects that
controls its character.
71 The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Person Statute,
for example, is found in the Illinois Criminal Code.
The California Sexual Psychopath Statute, on the
other hand, is found among the California Welfare and
Institutions Statutes.
72 People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534
(1938) (court found that the Michigan Sexual Psycho-
path Statute was "more than an inquest" because it
was placed in the Michigan code of criminal pro-
cedure).73 Evidently some states are not entirely aware of
this as is made manifest in the Pennsylvania statute.
For the better administration of justice and the
more efficient punishment, treatment and rehabilita-
tion of persons convicted of [sex offenses] if the court
is of the opinion that any such person ... constitutes
a threat of bodily harm to members of the public,
or is an habitual offender and mentally ill, the court
in lieu of the sentence now provided by law, for
each such crime, may sentence such person to a
State institution for an indeterminate term....
[emphasis added] PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1166
(1958).
since he is in a sense tried a second time for the
same crime with the possibility of his receiving a
longer sentence under the sexual psychopath
statute than he already received in the regular
criminal trial. Similarly, in those states which
would allow criminal procedures to commence
upon the release of the offender from "treatment",
it would appear that these subsequent proceedings
would possibly result in an added penalty for the
crime for which the offender had already been
punished.
If it can be shown, however, that the purposes
of commitment are curative and not punitive, then
the claim of double jeopardy may be rebutted.
Furthermore, where the accused need not be con-
victed of a criminal offense before the proceedings
may be initiated or where he is not subject to
criminal proceedings upon his release from
"treatment", the double jeopardy problem does
not exist. The problem remains, however, whether
one, upon commitment, is punished for his "abnor-
mality".
It may well be contended that the privilege
against self-incrimination should extend to the
sexual psychopath proceedings. It is self-evident,
on the other hand, that in order for a psychiatrist
to make a correct diagnosis of a person's mental
condition, such person must be subjected to
examination. Furthermore, perhaps the usual
evidentiary privileges should not apply since the
proceedings are supposedly for the benefit of the
alleged offender. The more delicate problem,
however, is to determine how far an alleged sex
offender can be compelled to disclose facts which
might lead to the discovery of past crimes. Clearly,
any information might validly be used by the
psychiatrist in forming his opinion of the mental
condition of the alleged sex offender. However, in
the hands of a state prosecutor it might easily lead
to conviction of the individual for any past crimes
he may have committed. Thus, the privilege
against self-incrimination is, in effect, infringed
upon, since the information the person is ordered
to disclose might well tend to incriminate him for
his past crimes if such information is used in
subsequent criminal proceedings.74
Another objection made to the sexual psycho-
74 Some statutes, aware of such possibilities, have
stipulated that the record of the examination not be
made public, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §202.720 (1952).
Others have further provided the alleged sex offender
with immunity from subsequent criminal prosecution
growing out of any acts or information he was com-
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path proceedings is that the right to a jury trial is
not always guaranteed. In reply to this objection,
it has been explained by a number of courts that
a trial by jury is not a constitutional requirement
for the proceedings under consideration because the
sexual psychopath statutes prescribe special pro-
ceedings which are not criminal in nature, nor are
they civil in the sense that damages are to be
awarded, but instead, are designed to ultimately
benefit the alleged offender, much like the pro-
ceedings for the insane and juvenile delinquents.75
As previously mentioned, some statutes prohibit a
jury from hearing sexual psychopath cases, while
others leave it to the judge's or alleged offender's
discretion. 6 Leaving the decision of having a jury
up to the accused is by far the wisest thing to do
regardless of whether doing otherwise is consti-
tutional. There would be many occasions when it
would be advisable to have only the court hear a
particular case, especially when prejudice is
likely to run high (e.g., when the accused is
suspected of having committed a nefarious crime).
In such instances a private hearing, without a
pelled to disclose to the examining psychiatrists, e.g.,
IND. ANN. STAT. §9-3409 (Supp. 1959).
The Indiana Statute clearly protects the alleged
offender and at the same time enables the examining
psychiatrists to obtain sufficient information upon
which to make a useful report to the court. Further-
more, should the person be determined a sexual psycho-
path, knowledge that he will not have to face criminal
proceedings upon release gives him incentive to co-
operate and reform under "treatment". Objection has
been made to this approach, however, in that the
person may not be adjudicated a sexual psychopath,
but having confessed all his past crimes, he has assured
himself of immunity from subsequent prosecution.
This has discouraged many prosecutors from pro-
ceeding under the statutes.
Closely related to the matter of self-incrimination
is the problem as to what may be admitted in evidence
during the sexual psychopath hearings. Many statutes
explicitly provide that past acts may be admitted in
evidence in order to determine whether one comes
within their provisions or not. See note 30 supra.
The courts have generally sustained these statutes,
though usually with reservations. The possibility of
prejudicing the jury is an important factor to be recog-
nized. See People v. Capoldi, 10 ll.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d
776 (1957) (court held that it was prejudicial error to
admit confessions of defendant in a sexual psychopath
proceeding without preliminary showing of voluntary
nature of such confessions); People v. Wasker, 353
Mich. 447, 91 N.W.2d 866 (1958) (court held it was
prejudicial error to receive testimony of three examining
psychiatrists in sexual psychopath proceeding, whose
evidence had necessarily been tainted by their reception
of information gained by one of them in his confidential
relationship as defendant's personal psychiatrist).7 1 In re Moulton, 96 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26 (1950)
(court held that trial by jury is not a constitutional
requirement in special statutory proceedings).
76 See note 31 supra.
jury, should be had. However, there are other
occasions when it might be advisable to have a
public trial with a jury deciding the facts of the
case (e.g., where an exhibitionist or fetishist is
involved, and where public prejudice is not as
likely to be inflamed), especially where the court
and the accused are more concerned as to what the
layman considers to be "normal" sexual activity.
It is evident that the courts have recognized the
various objections made concerning the sexual
psychopath proceedings, for if the statutes do not
explicitly provide for certain rights and protections
the courts themselves frequently read such rights
and protections into the various statutes. Thus,
the courts have held that the right to a writ of
habeas corpus, which is available to the insane
and mentally defectives, is available also to persons
who have come within the provisions of the sexual
psychopath statutes.77 Furthermore, some courts,
and often the statutes explicitly, will allow the
rights of notice, personal attendance, counsel, bail,
presentation of evidence, subpeonaing of witnesses,
cross-examination, and appeal. 78 In light of all the
attacks leveled at the sexual psychopath acts, it
is fairly apparent why the accused sex offenders
especially should be entitled to each of these pro-
tections.
Treatment of Sexual Psychopaths
It is dear that the sexual psychopath statutes
must make provision for a fair hearing with the
ultimate result of such hearing being either release
or treatment. But, where because of the lack of
adequate treatment facilities a sex deviate is
incarcerated for a period of time not in proportion
to the actual offense complained of, and under
conditions that amount to little or complete
absence of treatment, very serious doubts arise as
to whether such unwarranted, prolonged incarcer-
ation might not be considered punishment-
indeed, even cruel and unusual punishment.
In any case, it seems that if the treatment given
to certain sex offenders contributes little to their
rehabilitation, it is equivalent to punishment.
There is no justification for continued "treatment"
if it is ineffective, especially in the cases where
conviction of a crime is not necessary for adjudi-
cation as a sexual psychopath. The remedial aspect
of confinement must have foundation in fact and
it is not sufficient that the legislature announce a
71 See note 24 supra.
78 See notes 20 through 29, & 66 supra.
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remedial purpose if the consequences to such
person are punitive.
79
Many states, realizing that it is sometimes
difficult to provide adequate treatment facilities,
have provided that the period for treatment is not
to exceed the criminal sentence the patient could
receive or has already received for the crime he
committed. s0 However noble this may seem, there
may be situations in these states where the avowed
purpose of the statutes (i.e., curing the offender and
protecting society) will fail to be carried out, as
where an offender is not fully recovered by the
time his criminal sentence expires. These same
states, on the other hand, admittedly are realizing
that the methods of treatment and rehabilitation
of sex offenders are not adequate. Perhaps the only
partial solution to this dilemma at present is for
the states to provide the best treatment facilities
available, and for those persons who may be
effectively cured thereby to be committed for an
indeterminate period of time (i.e., until sufficient
recovery is achieved). Those who would not benefit
from the treatment facilities available should not
be brought under the sexual psychopath acts.
The question is frequently raised: Has the
patient any assurance of being released upon his
recovery? It has already been mentioned that he
might have the rights of appeal and habeas corpus.
Mandamus would also possibly lie against the
person in charge of him if such person has ca-
priciously or arbitrarily refused to form opinion
and make certification."' Nevertheless, this is
another instance where abuse is likely to be found
79 A number of recent cases have indicated the courts'
particular concern over the problem of "treatment
versus punishment." In Commonwealth v. Page, 159
N.E.2d 82 (Mass. 1959), the court said nothing to
invalidate the Massachusetts Sexual Psychopath Stat-
ute, but it did invalidate a commitment made pursuant
thereto, when in fact no treatment facilities were to be
had. The court viewed this as punishment and con-
trary to the patient's right of due process of law.
Also see State v. Wingler, 25 NJ. 161, 135 A.2d
468 (1957), where Judge Heher wrote a vigorous dissent
wherein he maintained that the sexual psychopath was
denied due process and equal protection when he was
put in prison because he rebelled against "treatment".
80 See note 42 supra.81 People v. Albin, 111 Cal. App. 2d 800, 245 P.2d
660 (1952) (court held that mandamus would lie if
officials have capriciously or arbitrarily refused to form
opinions and to make certification of the patient's
recovery or failure to respond to treatment). As one
court has said, "[D]efendant's right to ... a fair hearing
on the issue of whether or not he has recovered from his
sex psychopathy, is not to be denied at any time."
Malone v. Overholser, 93 F.Supp. 647 (D.C. Dist. Col.
1950); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 377-380 (1952).
especially in light of the fact that one can never be
quite sure when a sexual psychopath is cured.
The problem of release is equally as troublesome
as the problem of commitment, for in the case of
release the person or staff in charge of the offender
must determine upon similar subjective notions
when such offender is no longer a "menace to
society." Once again, argument can be made that
the sexual psychopath statutes deny due process
because they do not establish objective standards
and criteria, but, on the other hand, give the force
of law to human error and mere opinion.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECO?, 1NDATIONS
Many people would deem it advisable to repeal
the sexual psychopath statutes.8 With a few
exceptions, such as the California statute, they
have not been widely used. Several reasons have
been suggested for the failure to use these laws:
One is that the laws were passed in a period of
panic and were forgotten after the emotion was
relieved by this action. A second reason is that
the state has no facilities for the care and
custody of sexual psychopaths; the state hos-
pitals are already crowded with psychotic
patients. A third reason is that the prosecutor
and judge, anxious to make records as vigorous
and aggressive defenders of the community,
favor the most severe penalty available and are
unwilling to look upon serious sex criminals as
patients.... Finally, it is reported that defense
attorneys have learned that they can stop the
proceedings under this law by advising their
clients to refuse to talk to the psychiatrists.n
Some people will contend that even if the sexual
psychopath statutes are extensively used, they will
not effectively deter other potential sex offenders
from committing sex crimes since by analogy
similar proceedings provided for juvenile delin-
quents have not significantly reduced juvenile
delinquency.
Nevertheless, the proposal to do away with the
sexual psychopath statutes is unrealistic. The
reasons for their enactment (i.e., to protect
society and to rehabilitate the offender) are highly
2 Thus, in New York, the Governor vetoed the
1947 bill providing for such procedures.
Also, one author has said:
For the protection of society from the small
group of major sex deviants responsible, our con-
stitutional legal remedies, the prison, the electric
chair or the asylum for the criminally insane are
adequate. PLoscowE, SEx AND = LAW (1951).
8 Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40
J. CrIm. L. & C. 543, 553 (1950).
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commendable. Furthermore, with the advancement
of medical science, these statutes may pave the
way for laws which will provide for treatment of all
criminals. But, for the present, realizing the limi-
tations of medical science, as well as public re-
luctance to "coddle the offender," it would perhaps
be more realistic to advise a conservative revision,
rather than an abolition, of certain sexual psycho-
path laws in order that constitutional objections
might be eliminated.
4
Hence, the following points are submitted for
consideration. The statutes should change the
designation of condition to "Sexually Dangerous
Persons", the reader realizing of course that what
the offender is called is not nearly so crucial as
what class of persons the statute shall include.
"Sexually Dangerous Persons" would include any
person reflecting the existence of a mental disorder
or personality disturbance coupled with pro-
pensities to commit any kind of sex crime which
physically threatens others. The term "Sexually
Dangerous Persons" would thus include only those
persons constituting a physical threat to other
persons, hence leaving the less harmful offenders
(e.g., exhibitionists, voyeurs, frotteurs, and
fetishists) who do not constitute such a threat,
to be dealt with by different legislation.n
If probable cause is shown by a state prosecutor
that someone is a "Sexually Dangerous Person",
and a trial judge agrees with the allegation on the
basis of the facts shown, the court should conduct
a hearing to determine if such person is indeed a
"Sexually Dangerous Person" and if so, whether he
can be cured by treatment. If a criminal trial has
commenced, the trial judge should have the power
to arrest the proceedings at any point and likewise
* order a similar hearing. Furthermore, every person
convicted of a sex crime which physically threatens
others should automatically be given a hearing to
determine whether such person is a "Sexually
Dangerous Person".
At this point, two criticisms will immediately
be noticed. First, the objections of vagueness and
improper classification have not been fully met.
But due to the limitations of medical science and
84 Also see suggestions in Report of the Illinois
Commission on Sex Offenders-To the 68th General
Assembly of the State of Illinois (1953).
86 It is submitted that legislation for "less harmful
offenders" may very well follow the same framework
as is now proposed for "Sexually Dangerous Persons".
See, for example, California's two statutes, one dealing
with sexual psychopaths and the other with mentally
abnormal sex offenders.
the English language, as well as existing public
opinion, perhaps this is as far as one can go- at
present. Second, the problem of harassment has
not been fully met. This objection has been some-
what lessened under these proposals by placing
the ultimate discretion in the trial judge as to
whether a special hearing shall be had. A more
lasting and effective way to handle the problem,
however, would be through further education of
those who come in contact with sex offenders and
whose duty it is to effectuate the purposes of the
sexual psychopath statutes." Of course the public
should also be enlightened as to the problems
involved in this area.
"Sexually Dangerous Persons" statutes should
explicitly provide for the procedural rights of
public or private hearing (at the alleged offender's
discretion), notice, personal attendance, habeas
corpus, bail, counsel, trial by jury (at the alleged
offender's discretion), cross-examination, presen-
tation of evidence, subpeonaing of witnesses, and
appeal.
These statutes should also provide for mental
examinations of the alleged offenders, with the
results thereof being submitted to the judge (and
jury if one is requested by the alleged offender).
The offender should be granted immunity from
any subsequent proceedings which may arise out
of evidence originally obtained at the hearing. The
examiners should be reputable and licensed psy-
chiatrists with a minimum of five years training
in psychiatric work.
In assuring that the proceedings do not become
criminal in nature, the end result of such pro-
ceedings must always be "effective treatment" and
not "effective punishment". The statutes must
provide for adequate treatment facilities. Further-
more, if it is known that effective treatment is not
available for certain "Sexually Dangerous
Persons", such individuals should be released on a
probation basis, or committed to other authorities
if already convicted of a crime.
If the accused has not been convicted of a crime
he should not be held for treatment beyond a
reasonable period of time. If he has been convicted,
it is advisable that he be detained no longer than
the maximum period of his criminal sentence
provided by law. If he recovers earlier, he should
be released on condition (i.e., parole, probation, or
out-patient treatment). If he has not recovered
at the end of the maximum period of his sentence
86 See note 60 supra.
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as provided by law for the crime he committed,
and if he has received the best treatment available,
to detain him any longer would amount to a cruel
and unusual punishment out of proportion to the
seriousness of his offense. Thus, he too should be
released on a conditional basis for an indefinite
length of time. Upon any infraction of the rules
governing such conditional release, the offender
should be subject to recommitment, if only to
protect society (even though no effective treatment
for him is known).
To alleviate the fears of indefinite confinement,
the committing court should be required to con-
sider each particular case at regular intervals, say
once a year, and upon request by the patient, his
custodian, or his friends and relatives at any time
within reason during such interval.
Where the patient has been convicted of a crime
which gave rise to these proceedings, the treatment
(provided it is effective) should be in lieu of any
sentence conferred upon such person. Whether he
has been convicted of any crime or not, he should
not be punished for any crime he did commit
which presumably was a product of his mental
disorder. If effective treatment is unavailable for
him, however, he may have to suffer incarceration
in order that society may be protected.
Obviously, the feasibility of any proposals made
are limited by medical science. The advancements
in the legal sphere necessarily must comport with
those made in the medical world. Thus, it may take
many decades before the idea of "mental
treatment" supplants that of punishment. Eventu-
ally, perhaps, the classification can be expanded
to include any person reflecting the existence of a
mental disorder or personality disturbance coupled
with propensities to commit any kind of crime
which physically threatens others.
Meanwhile, however, with courts having upheld
the existing sexual psychopath statutes, one can
only implore those applying the laws to be con-
stantly on guard for any possible infringement of
an individual's constitutional rights.
87
87 Thus, for example, it is imperative that the courts
make the utmost endeavor to be certain that any
charges made against alleged sex offenders be entirely
substantiated by fact. See In re Maddox, 351 Mich.
358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958), where the court held that
the sex offender was denied due process when he was
transferred from the state hospital for the criminally
insane to the state prison largely because certain police
officers and certain doctors believed that he was guilty
of criminal offenses to which he had never admitted
nor of which he had ever been convicted. The court
found a flagrant abuse of the sexual psychopath
statute since the offender was given in effect a life
sentence in the state prison, based solely on medical
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